Supplier selection and contract enforcement: Evidence from performance bonding

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2022-07-13 DOI:10.1111/jems.12492
Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Gabriele Rovigatti
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引用次数: 9

Abstract

We analyze an important but little-studied institution for balancing supply risk in the management of procurement operations: performance bonding. By adding the surety as a third party that guarantees contract fulfillment between supplier and buyer, performance bonding aims to streamline the purchasing process by influencing both contractor selection in the bidding phase and contract enforcement during project execution. Using the data on US government procurement from 2005 to 2015 and exploiting an exogenous variation in the threshold for its application to construction contracts, we find that performance bonding improves contract outcomes by 10.5% and 3.7% in terms of delays and extra costs, respectively. Net of bond premia, which by law are included in the award amounts, this effect translates into savings of about 4% in the budget for federal construction projects and 16% for mid-size projects. We provide suggestive evidence on the effectiveness of selection and monitoring by sureties as driving channels.

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供应商选择和合同执行:来自履约担保的证据
我们分析了采购业务管理中平衡供应风险的一个重要但很少被研究的制度:履约担保。通过增加作为第三方的担保人来保证供应商和买方之间的合同履行,履约担保旨在通过影响投标阶段的承包商选择和项目执行期间的合同执行来简化采购过程。利用2005年至2015年的美国政府采购数据,并利用其应用于建筑合同的阈值的外生变化,我们发现,在延迟和额外成本方面,绩效绑定分别使合同结果提高了10.5%和3.7%。扣除债券溢价(根据法律规定,债券溢价包含在奖励金额中)后,这种效应将为联邦建设项目节省约4%的预算,为中型项目节省16%的预算。我们为担保人作为驱动渠道的选择和监督的有效性提供了启发性证据。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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