Wilfrid Sellars on Science and the Mind

Anke Breunig
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

ABSTRACT:This paper explores some ideas of Wilfrid Sellars to raise two difficulties for a naturalistic approach to the mind. The first difficulty, which is methodological, is a corollary of Sellars’s distinction between two images of man-in-the-world, the manifest and the scientific image. For Sellars, taking science seriously requires that we think of it as constructing a unified image of man-in-the-world of its own. I argue that it is the rivalry between the manifest and the scientific image which gives rise to the mind-body-problem. The challenge for a naturalistic solution to the mind-body-problem is that it is not legitimate to isolate single scientific results from their theoretical context in order to integrate them piecemeal into the manifest image. According to Sellars, a satisfactory solution to the mind-body-problem must attempt nothing less than a fusion of both images which somehow respects and preserves the unity of each. The second, substantial difficulty for a naturalistic approach to the mind is that of coming to terms with the normativity of the mental. Many interpreters take Sellars to hold that normativity sets the mental apart from the rest of nature. Against this I argue that according to Sellars the living is governed by norms of its own. It follows that normativity cannot serve as the mark of the mental. I argue that according to Sellars the distinguishing feature of the mental lies elsewhere, namely in the way in which normative force comes about. Unlike biological norms, the norms of thought owe their force to a common practice of mutual evaluation. However, the assumption that there are norms in animate nature should make it easier for naturalists to accept that the mental is characterized by norms of its own.
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威尔弗里德·塞拉斯《科学与心灵
摘要:本文探讨了威尔弗里德·塞拉斯的一些思想,提出了用自然主义方法研究心灵的两个困难。第一个困难是方法论上的,这是塞拉斯区分世界中人的两种形象的必然结果,即显象形象和科学形象。对于塞拉斯来说,认真对待科学要求我们把它看作是构建一个统一的人在世界中的形象。我认为,正是表象与科学表象之间的竞争导致了身心问题的产生。对身心问题的自然主义解决方案的挑战在于,将单个科学结果从其理论背景中分离出来,以便将它们零碎地整合到明显的图像中,这是不合理的。根据塞拉斯的说法,一个令人满意的身心问题的解决方案必须尝试将两种图像融合在一起,以某种方式尊重并保持两者的统一性。第二个,自然主义研究心灵的主要困难是,如何接受心灵的规范性。许多诠释者接受塞拉斯的观点,认为规范性将精神与自然的其他部分区分开来。与此相反,我认为,根据塞拉斯的观点,生活是由其自身的规范所支配的。由此可见,规范性不能作为精神的标志。我认为,根据塞拉斯的观点,精神的显著特征在于别处,即规范性力量产生的方式。与生物规范不同,思想规范的力量来自于相互评价的共同实践。然而,假设在有生命的自然界中存在规范,自然主义者应该更容易接受这样一种观点,即精神有其自身的规范。
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