How To De-reserve Reserves

Orhan Aygun, Bertan Turhan
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Reserve systems have been designed and implemented for numerous real-world resource allocation problems. Often, de-reservation policies accompany reserve systems to prevent waste in instances of low demand for exclusive reserve categories. De-reservation policies must be executed carefully so that allocation mechanisms have desired properties. We evaluate the de-reservation policy that has been implemented in admissions to technical universities in India and reveal its shortcomings. We introduce two families of choice procedures—backward and forward transfers choice rules—and deferred acceptance mechanisms with respect to these choice rules to retrieve these shortcomings. We introduce a framework to compare choice rules on the basis of merit and show that forward transfers choice rules select more meritorious sets than backward transfers choice rules.
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如何去准备金化
储备系统的设计和实施是为了解决许多现实世界的资源分配问题。通常,取消保留政策伴随着保留制度,以防止在对专属保留类别需求低的情况下浪费。必须仔细执行取消保留策略,以便分配机制具有所需的属性。我们评估了在印度技术大学招生中实施的取消预留政策,并揭示了其缺点。我们介绍了两类选择程序——向后和向前转移选择规则——以及针对这些选择规则的延迟接受机制来弥补这些缺点。我们引入了一个框架来比较基于价值的选择规则,并证明向前转移选择规则比向后转移选择规则选择更多的有价值集。
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