{"title":"Multiparty engineering is a contact sport","authors":"P. Barry, M. Koehler","doi":"10.1109/SysCon.2013.6549935","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, the authors suggest that essential coordination aspects multiparty engineering can be formally modeled with utility and game theoretic approaches. The computational complexity of evolving utility theories which change the payoff structures and consequently the “game” that the boundedly rational participants are playing along with the stochastic nature of the decisions are investigated using an agent-based model.","PeriodicalId":218073,"journal":{"name":"2013 IEEE International Systems Conference (SysCon)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2013 IEEE International Systems Conference (SysCon)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SysCon.2013.6549935","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
In this paper, the authors suggest that essential coordination aspects multiparty engineering can be formally modeled with utility and game theoretic approaches. The computational complexity of evolving utility theories which change the payoff structures and consequently the “game” that the boundedly rational participants are playing along with the stochastic nature of the decisions are investigated using an agent-based model.