On Not Seeing What Lies Open to View in Wittgenstein and Whitehead: A Response to Jerry H. Gill and Richard McDonough

Abstract

In this article, I discuss two recent accounts of potential philosophical links between Whitehead and Wittgenstein, one by Jerry H. Gill (Process Studies 43.1) and a response to it by Richard McDonough (Process Studies 45.2). I argue that Gill and McDonough fail to do full justice to the views of Whitehead and Wittgenstein on language and the nature of philosophy. I also argue that they miss an obvious link between Whitehead and Wittgenstein that would have made the engagement with their works more productive. Borrowing a metaphor from Wittgenstein, I argue that Gill and McDonough not only fail to see what is open to view regarding the views of Whitehead and Wittgenstein on language and philosophy, but also regarding their agreement on the transcendent nature of values as such.