Idealism, Disproportionality, and Democracy: A Reply to Chambers and Garvey

Abstract

There are three phases to the argument I develop in “Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy.” In the first, methodological phase, I argue for a Rawlsian approach to the problem of punishment, and construct a model of the original position that, I claim, represents the appropriate perspective from which to derive principles on the basis of which a liberal democracy might legitimately punish convicted offenders. In the second phase, I put this model to work to determine the content of such principles. And in the third phase, I draw on the principles just derived to evaluate the legitimacy of current policies and practices. Taken together, the comments offered by Professors Chambers and Garvey raise questions bearing on each phase of my argument. I cannot in this brief essay adequately respond to all their thoughtful observations, but I will attempt to address what I take to be their main concerns.