Philosophy, Feinberg, Codification, and Consent: A Progress Report on English Experiences of Criminal Law Reform

Abstract

Stuart Green’s letter soliciting contributions to this Symposium Issue began by observing that “[a]mong moral and legal philosophers, Feinberg’s work has enjoyed enormous influence. In the legal academy, however, his work is less well known than it should be.” Professor Green is commenting on the American situation. From an English perspective, I would add only a slight gloss. Joel Feinberg’s writings on the philosophy of criminal law, particularly but not exclusively his magnum opus on the moral limits, are reasonably well known to English criminal law students and teachers, at least to those who make use of the more up-market, theoretically informed textbooks and periodicals. But although Feinberg is frequently quoted and cited in the introductory sections of English textbooks, his ideas and arguments are seldom used, that is, put to work in detailed doctrinal analysis or practical problem-solving. His