On Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of Stable Matchings with Contracts

Jun Zhang
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

We introduce two new sufficient conditions for the existence of stable outcomes in many-to-one matching with contracts. The conditions subsume the observable substitutability of Hatfield et al. (2015) and the substitutable completability of Hatfield and Kominers (2016) as special cases. We also prove that unilaterally substitutability and irrelevance of rejected contracts imply substitutable completability.
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关于带契约的稳定匹配存在的充分条件
引入了多对一契约匹配稳定结果存在的两个新的充分条件。这些条件包括Hatfield et al.(2015)的可观察可替代性和Hatfield and Kominers(2016)的可替代可完全性作为特例。我们还证明了被拒绝契约的单方可替代性和不相关性意味着可替代性。
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