{"title":"SPARSE: Spatially Aware LFI Resilient State Machine Encoding","authors":"Muhtadi Choudhury, Shahin Tajik, Domenic Forte","doi":"10.1145/3505253.3505254","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"As finite state machines (FSMs) control the behavior of sequential circuits, they can be a target for attacks. With laser-based fault injection (LFI), an adversary may attain unauthorized access to sensitive states by altering the values of individual state flip-flops (FFs). Although standard error correction/detection techniques improve FSM resiliency, all states and FFs of an FSM are assumed equally critical to protect, incurring significant overhead. In this paper, we introduce a novel spatial vulnerability metric to aid the security analysis, which precisely manifests the susceptibility of FSM designs to LFI based on state FF sensitivity and placement. A novel encoding and spatially aware physical design framework (SPARSE) are then proposed that co-optimize the FSM encoding and state FF placement to minimize LFI susceptibility. SPARSE’s encoding uses the minimum number of FFs by placing security-sensitive FFs a sufficient distance apart from other FFs. SPARSE is demonstrated on 5 benchmarks using commercial CAD tools and outperforms other FSM encoding schemes in terms of security, area, and PDP.","PeriodicalId":342645,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3505253.3505254","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
As finite state machines (FSMs) control the behavior of sequential circuits, they can be a target for attacks. With laser-based fault injection (LFI), an adversary may attain unauthorized access to sensitive states by altering the values of individual state flip-flops (FFs). Although standard error correction/detection techniques improve FSM resiliency, all states and FFs of an FSM are assumed equally critical to protect, incurring significant overhead. In this paper, we introduce a novel spatial vulnerability metric to aid the security analysis, which precisely manifests the susceptibility of FSM designs to LFI based on state FF sensitivity and placement. A novel encoding and spatially aware physical design framework (SPARSE) are then proposed that co-optimize the FSM encoding and state FF placement to minimize LFI susceptibility. SPARSE’s encoding uses the minimum number of FFs by placing security-sensitive FFs a sufficient distance apart from other FFs. SPARSE is demonstrated on 5 benchmarks using commercial CAD tools and outperforms other FSM encoding schemes in terms of security, area, and PDP.