Transparency in Hierarchies

IF 4.9 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-10-20 DOI:10.1111/1475-679X.12516
CHRISTIAN HOFMANN, RAFFI J. INDJEJIKIAN
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Abstract

We use an agency model to address the benefits and costs of transparency in a hierarchical organization in which the principal employs a manager entrusted with contracting authority and several workers, all under conditions of moral hazard. We define the principal's transparency choices as a decision to allow workers to observe their coworkers’ performances (observability) and as an investment in monitoring worker performance (precision). We find that whereas precision alleviates agency conflicts as expected, observability can exacerbate agency conflicts, especially if the manager's interests are misaligned sufficiently with those of the principal. Our results suggest several testable hypotheses including predictions that opaque performance measurement practices are well suited for small organizational units at lower hierarchical ranks, and in settings where the sensitivity-precision of the available measures is low, workers’ performances are correlated positively, and managerial productivity is modest.

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等级制度的透明度
我们使用一个代理模型来探讨在一个层级组织中透明度的收益和成本问题,在这个组织中,委托人雇用了一名受托拥有订约权的经理和若干名工人,所有这些人都处于道德风险的条件下。我们将委托人的透明度选择定义为允许工人观察同事表现的决定(可观察性)和监督工人表现的投资(精确性)。我们发现,精确性可以缓解代理冲突,而可观察性则会加剧代理冲突,尤其是当管理者的利益与委托人的利益严重不一致时。我们的研究结果提出了几个可检验的假设,其中包括不透明的绩效衡量方法非常适合等级较低的小型组织单位,以及在可用衡量标准的灵敏度-精确度较低、工人的绩效呈正相关、管理者的生产率不高的情况下。
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来源期刊
Journal of Accounting Research
Journal of Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
6.80%
发文量
53
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting Research is a general-interest accounting journal. It publishes original research in all areas of accounting and related fields that utilizes tools from basic disciplines such as economics, statistics, psychology, and sociology. This research typically uses analytical, empirical archival, experimental, and field study methods and addresses economic questions, external and internal, in accounting, auditing, disclosure, financial reporting, taxation, and information as well as related fields such as corporate finance, investments, capital markets, law, contracting, and information economics.
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