Sexual exclusion and the right to sex

Abstract

Abstract Philosophers have recently expressed interest in the question as to whether there is a right to sex, a right whose justification is motivated by the existence of sexually excluded people – people who suffer from involuntary long‐term sexual deprivation (owing, say, to a chronic medical condition). This paper, after offering preliminary remarks about what a right to sex and its objects might be and who might have this right, surveys seven justifications for the right: linkage arguments, need, well‐being, a minimally decent life, being a basic good, justice, and relationships. The paper argues that a right to sex does not likely exist because none of the justifications are convincing. The paper then argues that despite the lack of justification, and because sexual exclusion is a problem worthy of attention, people's sexual needs can be addressed through the lens of goals instead of rights. This not only takes sexual exclusion seriously enough but also avoids the crucial problems associated with rights‐talk, especially that of sexual coercion.