The cognitive status of moral judgements

Abstract

The article deals with the problem of the cognitive status of moral judgements in moral philosophy and cognitive science. Having a cognitive status means that a judgement ade­quately expresses moral content in a form specific to morality. In moral philosophy, be­ginning with the Modern Times, the problem of cognitive status has been presented as a question about the nature of moral judgements and formulated as a dilemma of rea­son and sense. In the process of discussing this problem, two schools of thought emerged: intellectualism and sentimentalism, which set a paradigm for thinking about moral judge­ments that is also incorporated in contemporary ethics. In both, the assertion of the ‘ratio­nal’ or ‘emotional’ nature of moral judgements was used to justify such features as un­conditionality, directness, universality, imperativeness, and non-utilitarianism. In contem­porary cognitive science, the issue of the ‘rational’ or ‘emotional’ nature of moral judge­ments is related to the issue of the emotional-intuitive and rational-discursive factors in the formation of moral judgements. By analysing the theories of Jonathan Haidt, ac­cording to which sense-intuitive moral judgements have cognitive status, and Joshua Green, according to which only rational-discursive judgements have such status, it was shown that the dilemma of reason and feeling is not clarified in cognitive science, but only reproduced. The lesson that moral philosophy must learn from the discussion of moral judgements in cognitive science is to recognise that neither the validity of moral judgements nor their specific features depend on whether reason or feeling, reasoning or intuition is involved in their formation. These features are entirely determined by the specificity of morality as a cultural phenomenon and are not produced by natural mecha­nisms.