Augustinian Roots of Rawls's Second Principle of Justice: Grace and Fair Equality of Opportunity

Abstract

Abstract The debate over John Rawls's two principles of justice is ongoing. Among the many controversies, there is a hierarchal relationship within the second principle of justice. Scholars have long discussed the meaning and desirability of the lexical priority of the principle of fair equality of opportunity over the difference principle. The present article explores this topic from an unusual and underdeveloped angle. The controversy will be analyzed through the theological categories developed by the young Rawls in his work A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith . There, Rawls rejected the Pelagian heresy, according to which human beings can merit their salvation in a contractual relationship with God. Conversely, they can perform actions and deeds with implications for their eternal life by virtue of the gratuitous and undeserved intervention of God. I will show how this theological understanding became a political idea expressed precisely in the content and structure of the second principle of justice. As final remarks, I will argue that the appeal to the young Rawls's idea can be a suitable, yet unexpected, way in which the comprehensive doctrine of Christianity can support the political conception of justice expressed in Rawls's second major work, Political Liberalism.