Theorizing Multilevel Closure Structures Guiding Forum Participation

Abstract

Understanding how stakeholders choose to participate in different policy forums is central to research on complex, polycentric governance systems. In this paper, we draw upon the Ecology of Games Theory (EGT) to develop theoretical expectations about how four incentive structures may guide how actors navigate the world of policy forums. We test these expectations using unique data on a three-mode network of actors, forums, and issues related to climate change adaption in the state of Ohio, in the U.S. Midwest. Results of an exponential random graph model suggest that multilevel closure structures, which are a function of transaction costs and direct benefits, guide actors’ forum participation in ways that can either reinforce sub-optimal, ineffective governance arrangements, or conversely, encourage opportunities for innovation, increase diversity in representation, and facilitate policy learning. From a methodological standpoint, our research highlights the benefits of examining complex governance systems through the more precise approach allowed by three-mode network analysis, which has not been frequently used in research on polycentric governance systems up to this point.