Social Control From the Perspective of Agency Conflict in the Public Sector

Abstract

Purpose: This work has the general objective of analyzing how transparency, as an instrument of social control, can act as a mitigating element of agency conflict.   Theoretical Background: The present study is based on the theoretical assumption that the presence of greater social control reveals a greater level of society's control over public managers, reducing agency conflicts. To validate this assumption, Transparency will be analyzed as one of the control instruments, since, in a scenario of greater social control, managers tend to be more transparent and there is a better social environment.   Methodology: A quantitative methodology was used with correlation between the Transparency Index (IT), carried out by the Federal Public Ministry, with other social data, such as the socioeconomic indicators of the States (Human Development Index – HDI, Per Capita Income – RPC and Gini Index -GINI) and the number of police investigations against public administration opened in the States.   Results and Conclusion: It was possible to note that the Transparency Index analyzed is significantly correlated, with a positive sign, to the indicators of wealth and socioeconomic development, signaling possible evidence that more developed and richer locations tend to be more transparent.   Research Implications: The study advances in the verification of social control factors and the agency conflict that exists in the public sector, a fact still little explored in previous national literature.   Originality/Value: The lack of social control over the actions of its representatives ends up contributing to weak control in the effective solution of the agency conflict that exists in the public sector.