Global supply chains as global commons: some policy considerations from the perspective of microfoundations in an evolutionary framework

Abstract

Microfoundations have served as a foundation to inform different research interests in evolutionary economics. We will consider aspects of global supply chains. The focus for us will be, in particular, the (lack of) resilience of those structures and what measures might be promising to enhance their resilience. The framing we propose to outline the problem structure rests on (evolutionary) game theory and combines this with an understanding of the embedding system that relies on original institutional economics. This allows to illustrate potential issues that a methodological individualism cannot capture and can inform policy possibilities that go beyond some version of ‘making markets work better’. Specifically, we offer a perspective of global supply as a commons-like problem structure. From this perspective, in a decentralized decision-making structure, focusing on changes to individual incentives only, to increase the resilience of supply chains is not fundamentally achievable, but will have to be supported in further ways by policymakers and administrative units.