Green finance when stakeholders’ interests collide with each other: the case of Bangladesh

Abstract

PurposeThis study examines the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) power, institutional investors and their interaction on green financing provided by Bangladeshi financial institutions and the moderating effect of government policy and CEO political connections on these relations.Design/methodology/approachWe employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and interaction terms among variables of interest for the empirical analysis.FindingsGreen financing decreases with CEO power, implying that CEOs of this country’s financial institutions are averse to green loans, whereas institutional investors increase green financing extended by these institutions. The government policy, which includes financial incentives for complying financial institutions, strengthens institutional investors' positive impact on green financing, but it does not change CEOs' aversion to green loans. Institutional investors have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between green finance (GF) and CEO power, but this positive moderating effect is negated in banks where the government owns a stake, possibly because CEOs of state-owned financial institutions are politically connected, which reduces institutional investors’ influence over them.Originality/valueThis study is unique in that it is the first to examine how the interaction among different stakeholders affects green financing in a unique setting. As the literature is almost silent on this topic, the findings of this paper are expected to raise policymakers’ awareness of the obstacles that hamper the efforts of developing countries to go green.