Joseph Siani, Bertrand Tchantcho, Bill Proces Tsague
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Power measures are used to quantify the influence of members of a democratic institution. We consider voting games with abstention or (3,2) games, which are decision-making processes in which voting options include yes, no and abstention. The power indices that we study are based on the notions of minimal and shift minimal winning tripartitions. We define and characterize the Deegan–Packel and shift Deegan–Packel power indices in the class of (3,2) games. Furthermore, owing to the parameterization result obtained by Freixas et al. (Discret Appl Math 255:21–39, 2019), we provide computational formulae of these indices in the class of I-complete (3,2) games. These formulae allow us to determine the power of each player in a game, regardless of the number of minimal and/or shift minimal winning tripartitions of the game.
期刊介绍：
Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf
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