Bayesian stable states

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-03-21 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.008
Yi-Chun Chen , Gaoji Hu
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Abstract

This paper extends the Bayesian stability notion of Liu (2020) to define the Bayesian stability of a market state, which consists of a matching outcome and an information structure. The information structure can be arbitrarily heterogeneous and can accommodate learning among agents. We first establish that a Bayesian stable matching function of Liu (2020) can be recast as Bayesian stable market states with homogeneous information. We then illustrate the usefulness of such an extension by (i) refining Liu's Bayesian efficiency notion to define the Bayesian efficiency of a market state and (ii) generalizing his result—that Bayesian stable matching functions are Bayesian efficient—to an analogous one for market states. More importantly, we show that (iii) a decentralized matching process converges to a Bayesian stable market state and thereby offer a decentralized foundation for Liu's Bayesian stable matching function.

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贝叶斯稳定状态
本文扩展了 Liu(2020)的贝叶斯稳定性概念,定义了由匹配结果和信息结构组成的市场状态的贝叶斯稳定性。信息结构可以是任意异质的,并且可以容纳代理人之间的学习。我们首先确定,刘(2020)的贝叶斯稳定匹配函数可以重构为具有同质信息的贝叶斯稳定市场状态。然后,我们通过(i)改进刘的贝叶斯效率概念来定义市场状态的贝叶斯效率,以及(ii)将他的结果--贝叶斯稳定匹配函数是贝叶斯有效的--概括为市场状态的类似结果,来说明这种扩展的有用性。更重要的是,我们证明了(iii)分散匹配过程收敛于贝叶斯稳定市场状态,从而为刘的贝叶斯稳定匹配函数提供了一个分散基础。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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