{"title":"Instrumental Needs: A Relational Account","authors":"Espen Dyrnes Stabell","doi":"10.1007/s10677-024-10453-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Instrumentalism about need suggests that the normative significance of an agent’s need for <i>x</i> depends on the end for which <i>x</i> is needed. Instrumental accounts have, however, been vague about the transfer or transmission of normative significance supposed to be occurring from ends to needs. How should such transmission be understood, and how can we assess the amount or degree of significance being transmitted in particular cases? The Relational Account (RA) combines work on normative transmission principles and the strength of reasons in order to clarify these issues. RA, it is argued, both (1) improves the instrumental view on need and (2) can be used to analyze and assess a large range of needs and arguments from need – including ‘basic needs’, which some argue require non-instrumental explanation. While the paper develops an instrumental view, the analysis of the normativity of the needs-end relation will also be helpful for clarifying instrumental relations between different kinds of need in non-instrumentalist theories – such as relations between ‘absolute’ and intermediate needs.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-024-10453-0","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Instrumentalism about need suggests that the normative significance of an agent’s need for x depends on the end for which x is needed. Instrumental accounts have, however, been vague about the transfer or transmission of normative significance supposed to be occurring from ends to needs. How should such transmission be understood, and how can we assess the amount or degree of significance being transmitted in particular cases? The Relational Account (RA) combines work on normative transmission principles and the strength of reasons in order to clarify these issues. RA, it is argued, both (1) improves the instrumental view on need and (2) can be used to analyze and assess a large range of needs and arguments from need – including ‘basic needs’, which some argue require non-instrumental explanation. While the paper develops an instrumental view, the analysis of the normativity of the needs-end relation will also be helpful for clarifying instrumental relations between different kinds of need in non-instrumentalist theories – such as relations between ‘absolute’ and intermediate needs.
关于需要的工具论认为，代理人对 x 的需要的规范意义取决于需要 x 的目的。然而，工具论对于规范意义从目的到需求的转移或传递一直含糊其辞。我们该如何理解这种传递，又该如何评估在特定情况下传递的意义的数量或程度呢？关系论（RA）将规范性传递原则与理由的强度相结合，以澄清这些问题。本文认为，关系论证（RA）既（1）改进了关于需要的工具性观点，又（2）可用于分析和评估大量的需要和需要论证--包括 "基本需要"，而有些人认为 "基本需要 "需要非工具性的解释。虽然本文提出了一种工具性观点，但对需求-目的关系的规范性分析也有助于澄清非工具主义理论中不同类型需求之间的工具性关系--如 "绝对 "需求与中间需求之间的关系。
期刊介绍：
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice is a double-anonymous peer-reviewed philosophical journal which aims to publish the best work produced in all fields of practical philosophy. It welcomes high-quality, rigorous and original, submissions regardless of the traditions or schools of thought from which they derive. As an editorial priority, however, published papers should be accessible to the philosophical community at large and as free as possible of unnecessary jargon.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice publishes work on ethical theories that address practical problems, as well as work that presents or examines empirical findings regarding moral practices relevant for ethical theorizing. The journal therefore actively seeks to promote cross-fertilization across areas of practical philosophy—such as moral, political, legal, and social philosophy—and more empirical disciplines, such as medicine, economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. It welcomes work in applied ethics provided that it can offer theoretical or normative contributions to larger philosophical debates. The journal also considers historically-oriented contributions provided they are not mainly exegetical and can offer insights for current debates in practical philosophy.
The journal endorses the BPA/ SWIP-UK Good Practice for Journals. Further details are available in our Review Policy document.
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