{"title":"Wholesale Pricing with Asymmetric Information About the Quality of a Private Label","authors":"Johannes Paha","doi":"10.1007/s11151-024-09983-9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article derives the optimal wholesale tariff that is proposed by the monopolistic manufacturer of a branded product to a monopolistic retailer if the retailer also sells a private label whose quality is unobserved by the brand manufacturer. The focus is on market-share contracts where the manufacturer controls the quantities of both products. To learn the quality of the private label and diminish the retailer’s information rent, it distorts the quantity of the branded product downwards and that of the private label upwards. The manufacturer can control the quantity of the private label if it combines an excess payment with an end-of-year repayment.</p>","PeriodicalId":47454,"journal":{"name":"Review of Industrial Organization","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Industrial Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09983-9","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
This article derives the optimal wholesale tariff that is proposed by the monopolistic manufacturer of a branded product to a monopolistic retailer if the retailer also sells a private label whose quality is unobserved by the brand manufacturer. The focus is on market-share contracts where the manufacturer controls the quantities of both products. To learn the quality of the private label and diminish the retailer’s information rent, it distorts the quantity of the branded product downwards and that of the private label upwards. The manufacturer can control the quantity of the private label if it combines an excess payment with an end-of-year repayment.
期刊介绍：
New Online Manuscript Submission System The Review of Industrial Organization publishes research papers on all aspects of industrial organization, broadly defined. A main focus is on competition and monopoly, in their many forms and processes and their effects on efficiency, innovation, and social conditions. Topics may range from the internal organization of enterprises to wide international comparisons.
The Review is also increasing its interest in papers on public policies such as antitrust, regulation, deregulation, public enterprise, and privatization. Papers may deal with any economic sectors and any developed economies.
The Review continues its primary interest in ideas that can be verified by econometric evidence, case studies, or other real conditions. But the Review also seeks papers that advance significant theories of industrial organization and policy. Papers using abstract techniques and econometric tests should present the methods and analysis in plain enough English so that non-specialist readers can evaluate the content.
The Review welcomes submissions from any source, and the Editors will make every effort to have papers reviewed quickly and to give prompt decisions. The Editors will also seek to arrange symposia on specific topics, and they are open to proposals for grouped papers. They also welcome shorter notes and commentaries on topics of interest to the profession.
Officially cited as: Rev Ind Organ
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