{"title":"The ascending auction with flexible reporting","authors":"Xieji Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In the assignment problem where multiple heterogeneous indivisible items are assigned to unit-demand bidders, we introduce a novel ascending auction called the Flexible Reporting Ascending Auction to balance the privacy preservation and the speed of the ascending auction. Assuming bidders behave truthfully, it always results in a Walrasian equilibrium, along with the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. If each bidder reports without a contradiction, bidders’ truthful behavior forms a Nash equilibrium. Our auction generalizes some well-known ascending auctions in literature, and we also provide simulation results to compare these auctions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"132 ","pages":"Pages 28-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mathematical Social Sciences","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000854","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In the assignment problem where multiple heterogeneous indivisible items are assigned to unit-demand bidders, we introduce a novel ascending auction called the Flexible Reporting Ascending Auction to balance the privacy preservation and the speed of the ascending auction. Assuming bidders behave truthfully, it always results in a Walrasian equilibrium, along with the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. If each bidder reports without a contradiction, bidders’ truthful behavior forms a Nash equilibrium. Our auction generalizes some well-known ascending auctions in literature, and we also provide simulation results to compare these auctions.
期刊介绍：
The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences.
Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models.
Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.
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