Exploring the dilemma of straw economy in China: An analysis based on tripartite evolutionary game model

Abstract

The prohibition of open-air straw burning in China has been proved to be an effective measure for improving air quality and promoting straw utilization. However, the marketization and industrialization of straw utilization, or the commercialized development of “straw economy”, still faces several dilemmas. This paper constructed the tripartite evolutionary game model of farmers, straw utilization companies, and local governments, and analyzed the stability of equilibrium points to identify the strategic factors and influencing mechanisms among the stakeholders in straw industrialization. Moreover, numerical simulations are conducted to explore the effects of changes in key parameters and initial strategy selection on the evolution results under the market mechanism. The results showed that: (1) the optimal state of the tripartite evolutionary stability strategy of straw resource utilization is the formation of straw market, wherein farmers are inclined to vend straw, enterprises are eager to utilize it, and the government abstains from inducements. (2) farmers and straw utilization companies are highly sensitive to straw purchase prices and the other costs in straw utilization; (3) the evolutionary convergence of the strategy selection among the game subjects has shown an obvious interdependence. To promote the development of straw economy, the government ought to recalibrate policy instruments for the straw market temporally, sequentially implementing strategies encompassing subsidies, establishment of procurement depots, and commendation incentives.