The eco-evolutionary dynamics of two strategic species: From the predator-prey to the innocent-spreader rumor model

Abstract

Species frequently engage in both competitive and cooperative interactions, delicately balancing these dynamics to optimize their chances of survival and reproduction. While competition drives individuals to compete for limited resources, cooperation can emerge as a strategic response, mitigating risk and enhancing collective payoff. To bridge theoretical game approaches such as payoff, cooperation, and defections in ecological systems, we propose a two-species predator–prey model inspired by the principles and variations of the prisoner’s dilemma game. We comprehensively address and analytically verify all stable strategic states, exploring the role of payoff parameters both individually and collectively. Additionally, we investigate the effect of free space. Beyond ecological contexts, we present a model of rumor propagation within a social system to establish connections with the prisoner’s dilemma game. In both systems, our primary focus is to discuss strategies and enhance the cooperative factor within the system, given its crucial importance across diverse environments.