Contextual Realism in Physics

Abstract

Within the framework of a broadly Wittgensteinian approach, we criticize metaphysical realism, structural realism and Platonism in philosophy of physics and propose to replace them with what we call “contextual scientific realism.” According to this position, ontology is sensitive to context. Our view is illustrated with both ordinary and physical examples. In particular, we claim that the Higgs boson is a contextual entity within the framework of the Standard Model and the practice of its application, and that, in a sense, the nature of gravitational waves depends on the choice of a physical theory to describe them. A physical theory is interpreted as a Wittgensteinian rule (norm) for measuring physical reality within the language games if its applications. Contextual scientific realism explains the success of our best scientific theories and (dis)solves the problem of pessimistic meta-induction.