Institutional blockholder monitoring and stock price crash risk

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance Pub Date : 2024-10-23 DOI:10.1016/j.qref.2024.101933
Chune Young Chung , Pham Thi Ngoc Dung , Chang Liu
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Abstract

We examine whether institutional investors can reduce the risk of stock price crashes caused by managers’ intentional withholding of bad news. Specifically, we focus on the effect of institutional blockholder monitoring on stock price crash risk. The empirical results show negative relationships between institutional blockholdings and various crash risk variables, which suggests that institutional blockholder monitoring of nontransparent managerial behaviors can decrease crash risk. Furthermore, we find that the influence of monitors is more pronounced in firms with high information asymmetry, thereby corroborating the institutional blockholder monitoring role. This study validates the monitoring role of dedicated institutional investors in agency-motivated managerial behaviors.
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机构大股东监控与股价暴跌风险
我们研究了机构投资者能否降低因管理者故意隐瞒坏消息而导致的股价暴跌风险。具体而言,我们重点研究机构大股东监督对股价暴跌风险的影响。实证结果显示,机构大股东持股与各种股价暴跌风险变量之间存在负相关关系,这表明机构大股东对不透明经理人行为的监督可以降低股价暴跌风险。此外,我们还发现,在信息高度不对称的公司中,监督者的影响更为明显,从而证实了机构大股东的监督作用。本研究验证了专职机构投资者在代理动机管理行为中的监督作用。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
2.90%
发文量
118
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (QREF) attracts and publishes high quality manuscripts that cover topics in the areas of economics, financial economics and finance. The subject matter may be theoretical, empirical or policy related. Emphasis is placed on quality, originality, clear arguments, persuasive evidence, intelligent analysis and clear writing. At least one Special Issue is published per year. These issues have guest editors, are devoted to a single theme and the papers have well known authors. In addition we pride ourselves in being able to provide three to four article "Focus" sections in most of our issues.
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