Evolution of cooperation in heterogeneous populations with asymmetric payoff distribution.

Abstract

The emergence and maintenance of cooperation is a complex and intriguing issue, especially in the context of widespread asymmetries in interactions that arise from individual differences in real-world scenarios. This study investigates how asymmetric payoff distribution affects cooperation in public goods games by considering a population composed of two types of individuals: strong and weak. The asymmetry is reflected in the fact that strong players receive a larger share of the public pool compared to weak players. Our results demonstrate that asymmetric payoff distribution can promote cooperation in well-mixed populations and trigger the co-evolution of cooperation between sub-populations of strong and weak players. In structured populations, however, the effect of asymmetric payoff distribution on cooperation is contingent on the proportion of strong players and the extent of their payoff share, which can either foster or inhibit cooperation. By adjusting the interaction probability between strong and weak players based on their spatial arrangement on lattice networks, we find that moderate interaction probabilities most effectively maintain cooperation. This study provides valuable insights into the dynamics of cooperation under asymmetric conditions, highlighting the complex role of asymmetrical interactions in the evolution of cooperation.