Husserl's Notion of “Secondary Experience” as an Alternative Basis for Social Epistemology

Abstract

ABSTRACT The goal of this paper is to put on the map Husserl's discussion of “secondary experience” as an alternative basis for an epistemology of testimony. In current discussions about social epistemology, the majority of scholars characterize testimony as “the transfer of a belief.” On the contrary, in light of Husserl's notion of “secondary experience,” testimony is best characterized as a sharing of experience rather than a transfer of belief. Husserl discusses the notion of “secondary experience” in Appendix XII of Husserliana 15. In this paper I develop a systematic analysis of “secondary experience,” and I integrate Husserl's analysis of testimony in Appendix XII with his other analyses developed in the Cartesian Meditations, manuscripts written in the same period, and Experience and Judgment. In the conclusion of the paper I very briefly argue for the superiority of Husserl's view of testimony over the majority view.