Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures with Information Acquisition

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2014-11-01 DOI:10.1093/JLEO/EWT012
Chulyoung Kim
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引用次数: 28

Abstract

This article examines the properties of the two most commonly used legal institutions: the inquisitorial system and the adversarial system. In the former system, the judge makes a decision based on her own acquired information, whereas in the latter system, the advocates are required to present their acquired information to the uninformed judge. Within the binary decision framework, I study the circumstances in which one system is superior to the other in terms of accuracy. The following two effects are notable in the adversarial system: The advocates exert more effort regarding information acquisition than the judge, and the adversarial judge gleans additional information from non-disclosure events. However, one inherent weakness of the adversarial system is its communication problem. In cases in which such a problem is more pronounced, the inquisitorial system should prevail despite its lack of incentives for information collection. (JEL D74, D82, D83, K41)
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信息获取的对抗和调查程序
本文考察了两种最常用的法律制度的性质:讯问制度和对抗制度。在前一种制度下,法官根据自己获得的信息做出决定,而在后一种制度下,辩护人需要向不知情的法官提供他们获得的信息。在二元决策框架中,我研究了一种系统在准确性方面优于另一种系统的情况。在对抗制度中,辩护人在信息获取方面比法官付出更多的努力,而对抗法官则从非披露事件中收集更多的信息。然而,对抗系统的一个固有弱点是它的沟通问题。在这种问题较为明显的情况下,尽管缺乏收集资料的激励措施,但仍应采用讯问制度。(凝胶d74, d82, d83, k41)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
25
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