{"title":"Stackelberg game model of green tourism supply chain with governmental subsidy","authors":"Ruiyou Zhang, Zhiyou Li","doi":"10.1080/03155986.2022.2164438","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Green tourism has become a hot issue in both academic fields and companies recently. A green tourism supply chain composed of a government, a green scenic area and a travel agency is addressed using the game theory. The scenic area in the supply chain sells tickets to tourists through the travel agency, and makes extra investment on environmental protection to improve its green degree. The government provides financial subsidy to the green scenic area maximizing both the total social welfare and environmental improvements. Two Stackelberg game models of the green tourism supply chain, without and with the governmental subsidy, are built and solved by the backward induction method. The theoretical analyses indicate that the governmental subsidy can increase the demand of green tourism, and enhance the total social welfare and environmental protection level of the whole supply chain.","PeriodicalId":13645,"journal":{"name":"Infor","volume":"36 1","pages":"141 - 168"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Infor","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03155986.2022.2164438","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Abstract Green tourism has become a hot issue in both academic fields and companies recently. A green tourism supply chain composed of a government, a green scenic area and a travel agency is addressed using the game theory. The scenic area in the supply chain sells tickets to tourists through the travel agency, and makes extra investment on environmental protection to improve its green degree. The government provides financial subsidy to the green scenic area maximizing both the total social welfare and environmental improvements. Two Stackelberg game models of the green tourism supply chain, without and with the governmental subsidy, are built and solved by the backward induction method. The theoretical analyses indicate that the governmental subsidy can increase the demand of green tourism, and enhance the total social welfare and environmental protection level of the whole supply chain.
期刊介绍：
INFOR: Information Systems and Operational Research is published and sponsored by the Canadian Operational Research Society. It provides its readers with papers on a powerful combination of subjects: Information Systems and Operational Research. The importance of combining IS and OR in one journal is that both aim to expand quantitative scientific approaches to management. With this integration, the theory, methodology, and practice of OR and IS are thoroughly examined. INFOR is available in print and online.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
