{"title":"Supply Chain Contracts Under Uncertainty of Retailer Counterfeiting","authors":"N. Sundaresan, Janat Shah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2378226","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We model a supply chain scenario in which the genuine manufacturer is uncertain whether a retailer sells counterfeits alongside authentic products. We evaluate the optimal strategies for players under wholesale price contracts and two-part tariff contracts and analyse the impact of the uncertainty of retailer counterfeiting on the manufacturer’s pricing and expected profits. Furthermore, we investigate whether the two-part tariff is more effective compared with the wholesale price contract.","PeriodicalId":49886,"journal":{"name":"Manufacturing Engineering","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2014-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Manufacturing Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378226","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
We model a supply chain scenario in which the genuine manufacturer is uncertain whether a retailer sells counterfeits alongside authentic products. We evaluate the optimal strategies for players under wholesale price contracts and two-part tariff contracts and analyse the impact of the uncertainty of retailer counterfeiting on the manufacturer’s pricing and expected profits. Furthermore, we investigate whether the two-part tariff is more effective compared with the wholesale price contract.
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