{"title":"Are CEOs to Blame for Corporate Failure? Evidence from Chapter 11 Filings","authors":"Rajib Chowdhury, John A. Doukas","doi":"10.1561/114.00000011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study examines whether chief executive officers (CEOs) are to blame for corporate failures. Using alternative CEO managerial ability measures, we document that high-ability (low-ability) CEOs are less (more) likely to be associated with bankruptcy. We also find that reorganized firms run by high-ability incumbent CEOs experience improved financial performance after filing for Chapter 11. Firms that hire high-ability CEOs with bankruptcy experience also realize improved financial performance. Our evidence indicates that the likelihood of corporate bankruptcy is unrelated to the presence of high-ability managers and that bankruptcy does not adversely affect the post-bankruptcy careers of high-ability CEOs.","PeriodicalId":44656,"journal":{"name":"Review of Corporate Finance Studies","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Corporate Finance Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1561/114.00000011","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Abstract
This study examines whether chief executive officers (CEOs) are to blame for corporate failures. Using alternative CEO managerial ability measures, we document that high-ability (low-ability) CEOs are less (more) likely to be associated with bankruptcy. We also find that reorganized firms run by high-ability incumbent CEOs experience improved financial performance after filing for Chapter 11. Firms that hire high-ability CEOs with bankruptcy experience also realize improved financial performance. Our evidence indicates that the likelihood of corporate bankruptcy is unrelated to the presence of high-ability managers and that bankruptcy does not adversely affect the post-bankruptcy careers of high-ability CEOs.
期刊介绍:
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies (RCFS) is dedicated to publishing high-quality research in the expansive field of Corporate Finance. The journal seeks original contributions, reviewing papers based on their unique insights into Corporate Finance. This encompasses a wide spectrum, including a firm's interactions with stakeholders, capital markets, internal organization structure, compensation mechanisms, corporate governance, and capital management. RCFS also welcomes research in financial intermediation, financial institutions, microstructure, and the implications of asset pricing for Corporate Finance. The journal considers theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers for review.