: The received view has it that Hans Reichenbach and his friends of the Berlin Group worked close together with the more prominent Vienna Circle. In the wake of this view, Reichenbach was often treated as a logical positivist – despite the fact that he decisively opposed it. In this chapter we follow another thread. We shall show the “third man”– besides Reichenbach and Walter Dubislav – of the Berlin Group, Kurt Grelling, as a man who could grasp the academic trends of the time faster than anybody else, who was better informed about logic and philosophy of nature than his two prominent colleagues and thus, could better delineate, although tentatively, central threads of research of the Berlin Group. Grelling did this on several occasions, but most ostensibly in the last years of his life when he was focused on problems of formal ontology. On the basis of this analysis, we shall see that in the early 1920s, Reichenbach too was led by a project in ontology of science that he elaborated together with the psychologist Kurt Lewin. Moreover, Reichenbach’s later philosophy of nature was also shaped by this project. We present this direction of philosophy of science as a “road less travelled” which, however, if revived, can point to a new direction that will more closely connect philosophy and science.
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Pub Date : 2021-04-02DOI: 10.4324/9780429429835-19
M. Neuber
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Pub Date : 2019-08-26DOI: 10.4324/9780429429835-14
C. Glymour
Logical empiricism had two competing visions of philosophy of science, one passive from Kant and championed by Carnap, one active championed by Reichenbach. This essay summarizes the effects of these different dispositions on the Logical Empircists' contributions to science, and their reverberations in late 20th and 21st century philosophy of science.
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Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780429429835-18
Sebastian Lutz
The received view on the development of the correspondence rules in Carnap’s philosophy of science is that at first, Carnap assumed the explicit definability of all theoretical terms in observational terms and later weakened this assumption. In the end, he conjectured that all observational terms can be explicitly defined in in theoretical terms, but not vice versa. I argue that from the very beginning, Carnap implicitly held this last view, albeit at times in contradiction to his professed position. To establish this point I argue that, first, Carnap’s ‘Über die Aufgabe der Physik’ is a contribution to the philosophy of science of logical empiricism, contrary to Thomas Mormann and in agreement with Herbert Feigl. Second, Michael Friedman misunderstands the ‘Aufgabe’ with his claim that it describes a method for arriving at explicit definitions for theoretical terms. Another received view on Carnap’s philosophy of science is that it assumed a formalization of physical theories that was too detached from actual physics and thus justly disavowed in favor of the semantic view as, for example, developed by van Fraassen. But the ‘Aufgabe’ and related works including the Aufbau show that from the very beginning to his last works, Carnap suggested formalizing physical theories as restrictions in mathematical spaces, as in the state-space conception of scientific theories favored by van Fraassen.
关于卡尔纳普科学哲学中对应规则发展的公认观点是，卡尔纳普首先假定所有理论项在观测项中都具有明确的可定义性，后来又削弱了这一假设。最后，他推测所有的观测项都可以明确地用理论术语来定义，反之则不然。我认为，从一开始，卡尔纳普就含蓄地持有最后一种观点，尽管有时与他公开宣称的立场相矛盾。为了确立这一点，我认为，首先，卡尔纳普的“Über die Aufgabe der Physik”是对逻辑经验主义科学哲学的贡献，与托马斯·莫尔曼(Thomas Mormann)相反，与赫伯特·费格尔(Herbert Feigl)一致。其次，迈克尔·弗里德曼(Michael Friedman)误解了“Aufgabe”，他声称它描述了一种达到理论术语明确定义的方法。另一种关于卡尔纳普科学哲学的观点是，它假设了一种形式化的物理理论，这种理论与实际的物理太过分离，因此理所当然地否定了这种形式化的物理理论，而支持语义观点，比如范·弗拉森(van Fraassen)提出的语义观点。但是《Aufbau》和包括《Aufbau》在内的相关著作表明，从一开始到他最后的作品，卡尔纳普都建议将物理理论形式化为数学空间的限制，就像范·弗拉森所青睐的科学理论的状态空间概念一样。
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