表达性低级语言中无干扰的后验污点跟踪

2016 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) Pub Date : 2016-05-22 DOI:10.1109/SPW.2016.58

P. Aldous, M. Might

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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们之前提出了一种分析表达性低级语言的理论，该理论能够证明表达性语言的非干扰性。我们现在为驱动信息跟踪的污染流分析提供了一个独立的结果。特别地，我们证明了可以从无污染分析的结果中得出污染跟踪。除了提高性能之外，这种独立性还扩大了底层方法对信息流分析的适用性。

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A Posteriori Taint-Tracking for Demonstrating Non-interference in Expressive Low-Level Languages

We previously presented a theory of analysis for expressive low-level languages that is capable of proving non-interference for expressive languages. We now provide an independent result for the taint-flow analysis that drives tracking of information. In particular, we show that the taint-tracking can be derived from the results of a taint-free analysis. In addition to improving performance, this independence broadens the applicability of the underlying approach to information-flow analysis.

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2016 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW)

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