考虑用户对系统多样化贡献的智能电网网络定价

Xinhe Yang, C. Gu, Furong Li
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引用次数: 2

摘要

考虑电网用户对系统峰值的不同贡献,提出了一种改进的配电网定价的长期增量成本定价方法。采用shapley值法和修正的一致因子法确定网络用户对系统的各种贡献。通过对原始LRIC和修改后LRIC的比较,可以发现不同网络用户对系统峰值的贡献与网络收费呈正相关。根据合作博弈论和相应的网络投资延迟,探讨了潜在用户为获得话费削减而进行的行为改变。
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Network pricing for smart grids considering customers' diversified contribution to system
This paper proposes a modified long-run incremental cost pricing (LRIC) method for distribution network pricing considering the diversified contributions of network users to system peak. The Shapley-value method and modified coincident factor method are used to determine network users' various contributions to the system. The comparison between original LRIC and the modified LRIC indicates the positive correlation between the contribution to system peak and network charges for different network users. This paper also explores the potential users' behavior change to gain bill reductions according to the cooperative-game theory and the consequential network investment deferral.
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