投票权与生存:以执政党为例

Artyom Jelnov, Pavel Jelnov
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文运用风险率模型对议会制民主国家执政党的生存进行了实证研究。我们将危机的生存定义为在议会的关键投票中取得成功。我们建立了一个政治危机的一般概率模型,并对其进行了实证检验。我们发现,在危机期间,议会中的政党可能会彼此独立投票。因此,我们得到了之前的投票权文献假设的经验结果。
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Voting Power and Survival: The Case of a Ruling Party
In this article, we empirically study the survival of the ruling party in parliamentary democracies using a hazard rate model. We define survival of a crisis as being successful in a critical vote in the parliament. We develop a general probabilistic model of political crises and test it empirically. We find that during crises, parties in the parliament are likely to vote independently of each other. Thus, we receive as an empirical result what the previous voting power literature assumed.
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