Invención y explicación: la comprensión científica en biología

Biological sciences have often been deemed “special” sciences that follow a sui generis approach in relation to the physiochemical sciences, to which some think they should be reduced. In this article, this claim is addressed showing that scientific understanding takes place within the circuit of scientific understanding (CSU) - proper to all sciences and comprising two paths - the inventive path, related to practices of discovery and the explanatory path, associated with the actions of justification. Three very significant cases in the history of biology illustrate this contention: Darwin’s theory of natural selection, Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness, and Wolpert’s theory of positional information. After this inspection, three main consequences are drawn. First: scientific explanation is just one element, in addition to invention, of scientific understanding that takes place in CSU. Second: within CSU one should distinguish the basis for the formulation of hypotheses, in the inventive path, from the basis for their acceptance in the explanatory path that rules their conversion into principles. Third: biological sciences are not ‘special: they exhibit the same credentials, as regards scientific explanation and understanding, like all the other sciences.