True2F:防后门认证令牌

Emma Dauterman, Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, David Mazières, D. Boneh, Dominic Rizzo
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引用次数: 16

摘要

我们介绍了True2F,一个用于第二因素身份验证的系统,它在面对网络钓鱼和软件危害时提供了传统身份验证令牌的优点,同时还提供了针对令牌错误和后门的强大保护。为此,我们开发了新的轻量级两方协议,用于生成加密密钥和ECDSA签名,并实现了新的隐私防御,以防止跨域令牌指纹攻击。为了便于实际部署,我们的系统向后兼容当今支持u2f的web服务,并在固件修改后运行在商品硬件令牌上。受true2f保护的身份验证只需57ms就可以完成令牌,而不受保护的U2F则需要23ms。
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True2F: Backdoor-Resistant Authentication Tokens
We present True2F, a system for second-factor authentication that provides the benefits of conventional authentication tokens in the face of phishing and software compromise, while also providing strong protection against token faults and backdoors. To do so, we develop new lightweight two-party protocols for generating cryptographic keys and ECDSA signatures, and we implement new privacy defenses to prevent cross-origin token-fingerprinting attacks. To facilitate real-world deployment, our system is backwards-compatible with today’s U2F-enabled web services and runs on commodity hardware tokens after a firmware modification. A True2F-protected authentication takes just 57ms to complete on the token, compared with 23ms for unprotected U2F.
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