{"title":"无承诺优势的委托代理关系","authors":"R. Vohra, F. Espinosa, Debraj Ray","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3798785","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal’s payoff depends only on the payoff to the agent and her type.","PeriodicalId":105430,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Employers & Employees (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Principal-Agent Relationship with No Advantage to Commitment\",\"authors\":\"R. Vohra, F. Espinosa, Debraj Ray\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3798785\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal’s payoff depends only on the payoff to the agent and her type.\",\"PeriodicalId\":105430,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Employers & Employees (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"37 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Employers & Employees (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3798785\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Employers & Employees (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3798785","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Principal-Agent Relationship with No Advantage to Commitment
This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal’s payoff depends only on the payoff to the agent and her type.
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