The Transformation in Public Finance Administration

The political/administrative regime in Turkey has been radically transformed with the Constitutional Referendum held on 16 April, 2017. The new initiative nominalized a parliamentarian system which has been developed since 1876 with ups and downs, a constitutional legal order which came into being and developed with the Republic and the principle of the separation of powers brought by the 1961 Constitution. The system foreseen by the new Constitution was even beyond this: extreme concentration of power within the execution itself. In the Presidential Government System, the role of ministers turned into ordinarily appointed civil servants and they have lost their ability to assemble regularly, make decisions, prepare draft laws and submit them to the Parliament as a council. The administrative mentality in Presidential Government System does not rely on the principle of merit, instead, the relations in Presidential Government System are characterized with clientelism, nepotism and ideological affinities. The primary aim of this paper is to draw a framework for the transformation in public economic/public finance administration model and to do a critical analyze of the extent to which a monocratic model of administration can be a functional and to what extent it can remain outside of intra institutional conflicts. The main conclusion of this paper will be to state that Turkey’s priority is nothing other than to change this third world presidency regime and its administrative structure.