成就过度和强迫行为作为职业关注下的信号装置

A. Rodivilov, Dongsoo Shin, Xiaojian Zhao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文为劳动力市场中非专业活动的超额成就提供了一个理论基础。内在激励的工作者把他在非专业活动中的成就作为保护自己形象的信号装置。当工人的职业关注较弱时,他就不会在非职业活动上付出额外的努力。然而,当工作者的职业关注强烈时,他对非专业活动的努力水平可能会超过极乐点。在非常强烈的职业关注下,“强迫行为”会在平衡状态下出现,因为内在动机的员工可能会选择在职业生涯的早期阶段牺牲专业活动来从事非专业活动。
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Overachieving and Obsessive Behavior as Signaling Devices under Career Concern
This paper provides a rationale for overachievement in non-professional activities in the labor market. The intrinsically motivated worker uses his achievement in the non-professional activity as a signaling device to protect his image. When the worker's career concern is weak, he exerts no extra effort on his non-professional activity. When the worker's career concern is strong, however, his effort level for the non-professional activity can go beyond the bliss point. With a very strong career concern, an “obsessive behavior” can arise in equilibrium, as the intrinsically motivated worker may choose to sacrifice the professional activity for the non-professional activity in an earlier stage of his career.
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