A FEATURE‐BASED ACCOUNT OF GENERICITY AND KIND REFERENCE

Abstract Genericity encompasses two distinct phenomena. The first one is reference to a kind, whereby a predicate describes a property directly of a kind as in Dinosaurs are extinct . The second one is a characterizing or a generic sentence that expresses generalizations as in Cats meow . A feature of generic sentences is that they tolerate exceptions. We accept sentences such as Mosquitos carry the West Nile virus to be true although the predicated property characterizes less than 1 percent of the generic noun phrase. In this article, I propose a feature‐based account of genericity and kind reference linked to a formal semantics that articulates the features responsible for genericity and kind reference and where they are encoded. I argue that genericity and kind reference is due to the [−domain restriction] feature encoded on the (D)eterminer, the [+set] feature on the head of the Set Phrase, and the [+/−exception tolerance] feature encoded on a predicate. This feature‐based account explains why a sentence like Cats meow is tolerant of exceptions while Dinosaurs are extinct is not. My account is in line with the Borer‐Chomsky Conjecture (Baker 2008), according to which crosslinguistic parametric variation is due to differences in the features of functional heads.