具有高成本状态验证的策略默认和最优审计资源

IF 1.2 Q3 ECONOMICS Research in Economics Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI:10.1016/j.rie.2022.09.005

Andreas Krause

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我开发了一个模型，在这个模型中，偿还贷款的能力是私人信息，只有银行付出一定代价才能核实，如果银行不如实报告，就可以从借款人那里收回这些信息。银行将优化其用于对借款人进行审计的资源，然后得出均衡的特征。结果表明，在均衡状态下，很大一部分公司在战略上违约，但大多数都是通过审计发现的。银行的失败率也很低。最后讨论了扩展范围，包括对银行的有限责任和审计费用的部分回收以及对借款人的惩罚性费用。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Strategic default and optimal audit resources with costly state verification

I develop a model in which the ability to repay a loan is private information that can only be verified by the bank at some costs, which can be recovered from the borrower if it has reported untruthfully. The bank will optimize the resources it spends on this auditing of borrowers and the resulting equilibrium is then characterized. It is shown that in equilibrium, a significant fraction of companies default strategically, but most are captured via auditing. The failure rates of banks are also small. Finally extensions are discussed to include limited liability to banks and the partial recovery of auditing costs as well as punitive costs to borrowers.

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来源期刊

Research in Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

89 days

期刊介绍： Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.