Williams Huamani, Marcelo José Braga, Lucas Campio Pinha
{"title":"产品差异化程度、反垄断执法和卡特尔稳定性","authors":"Williams Huamani, Marcelo José Braga, Lucas Campio Pinha","doi":"10.1007/s00712-023-00851-w","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines the effect of antitrust enforcement on the stability of the quantity-setting cartel at different levels of horizontal product differentiation. We derive an incentive compatibility constraint that allows us to examine the effect of antitrust enforcement on cartel stability at different levels of horizontal product differentiation. We verified that both the antitrust enforcement and the degree of product differentiation affect cartel stability. We found that the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and cartel stability is increasing—if the products are more homogeneous, the cartel is less stable. Next, we prove that antitrust enforcement is more efficient (that is, its impacts more intense) in destabilizing the cartel if its products are highly differentiated, i.e., the cartel under antitrust enforcement is more stable when its products tend to be homogeneous.</p>","PeriodicalId":47523,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economics","volume":"116 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Degree of product differentiation, antitrust enforcement and cartel stability\",\"authors\":\"Williams Huamani, Marcelo José Braga, Lucas Campio Pinha\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s00712-023-00851-w\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This paper examines the effect of antitrust enforcement on the stability of the quantity-setting cartel at different levels of horizontal product differentiation. We derive an incentive compatibility constraint that allows us to examine the effect of antitrust enforcement on cartel stability at different levels of horizontal product differentiation. We verified that both the antitrust enforcement and the degree of product differentiation affect cartel stability. We found that the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and cartel stability is increasing—if the products are more homogeneous, the cartel is less stable. Next, we prove that antitrust enforcement is more efficient (that is, its impacts more intense) in destabilizing the cartel if its products are highly differentiated, i.e., the cartel under antitrust enforcement is more stable when its products tend to be homogeneous.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47523,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economics\",\"volume\":\"116 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-023-00851-w\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-023-00851-w","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Degree of product differentiation, antitrust enforcement and cartel stability
This paper examines the effect of antitrust enforcement on the stability of the quantity-setting cartel at different levels of horizontal product differentiation. We derive an incentive compatibility constraint that allows us to examine the effect of antitrust enforcement on cartel stability at different levels of horizontal product differentiation. We verified that both the antitrust enforcement and the degree of product differentiation affect cartel stability. We found that the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and cartel stability is increasing—if the products are more homogeneous, the cartel is less stable. Next, we prove that antitrust enforcement is more efficient (that is, its impacts more intense) in destabilizing the cartel if its products are highly differentiated, i.e., the cartel under antitrust enforcement is more stable when its products tend to be homogeneous.
期刊介绍:
Specializing in mathematical economic theory, Journal of Economics focuses on microeconomic theory while also publishing papers on macroeconomic topics as well as econometric case studies of general interest. Regular supplementary volumes are devoted to topics of central importance to both modern theoretical research and present economic reality. Fields of interest: applied economic theory and ist empirical testing.Officially cited as: J Econ