Ficta and Amorphism: a Proposal for a Theory of Fictional Entities

The aim of this paper is to propose an exploratory artefactual theory of fictional objects based on Evnine’s amorphism, with the goal of reconciling the inconsistent intuitions surrounding these entities. While not presenting a fully developed and comprehensive theory, I aim to explore the possibilities of amorphism and to offer a preliminary investigation into the nature of fictional objects and the challenges posed by our basic intuitions regarding their non-existence, creation, and property attribution. I formulate a two-level criterion of identity-based on creative acts and utilize the notion of internal predication to account for how fictional objects possess the properties attributed to them in relevant stories. Additionally, I propose considering a subset of essential properties to fix the identity of ficta across stories. Lastly, I address the challenge of negative existential statements by equating non-existence with unreality, asserting that fictional objects are constituted by the properties attributed to them but do not fully exemplify them.