How do signaling and reputation function as critical clues to e-commerce platform governance? Evidence from Chinese rice transaction data

Abstract

Despite the rapid advancement of online shopping, the challenge of asymmetric information, particularly within the realm of agricultural products, poses a hurdle to sustaining consistent customer engagement in e-commerce. Drawing upon governance theory and the cue congruence effect, the research aims to construct a comprehensive theoretical framework that encompasses platforms, providers, and customers. The primary objective is to empirically examine how platform governance can facilitate the presentation of valuable systems through signaling, review clues, and their significant moderating effects. Through an analysis of transaction data from China’s online rice market, employing both two-stage least square and three-stage least square models, the study reveals that robust signals and reputation can lead to increased prices and sales for high-quality products. Additionally, the study identifies the presence of congruence: prices appear to amplify the influence of signaling and reviews, while congruence between video displays and signals yields a negative impact. This research offers theoretical insights for future study and practical recommendations for policymakers and e-commence participants.