Can dynamical systems theory be applied to second language acquisition? The issues of reductionism and intentionality

In this article we address two key questions in the application of dynamical systems theory (DST) to second language acquisition (SLA) that have not been resolved in recent debates about this issue. The first question relates to reductionism. Is an antireductionist position a necessary element of DST? We show that the radical antireductionist stance put forward by key movers of the application of DST to SLA neither follows from the mathematics of DST nor from the application of DST to science and that radical antireductionism results in an impasse for empirical research. In contrast, we argue that reductionism offers ways in which theory-derived hypotheses can be formed about subsystems that can be studied empirically using DST mathematics. The second question relates to intentionality. Are physical systems and mental systems similar enough to justify applying DST principles based in the physical sciences to processes in the human mind? Following Tschacher, we argue that current evidence suggests that there is a limited class of mental phenomena that can arise from physical phenomena. It is only this class of mental phenomena that can currently be modeled using DST mathematics. We offer a discussion of these perspectives to indicate how important it is to resolve these fundamental questions. In our view, these fundamental issues need resolution to put the application of DST to SLA on a solid conceptual and empirical footing.