{"title":"管理行动主义","authors":"Şenay Ağca , Aslı Togan-Eğrican","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102588","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine managerial activism through collective action in the corporate sector. Activist managers spend considerable resources in pursuing pro-business and pro-manager issues. While managerial activism is valuable in the pursuit of pro-business strategies, pro-manager agendas may exacerbate agency problems. Our evidence shows that firm performance improves with managerial activism through collective pro-business effort but is diminished by pro-manager activism. Furthermore, pro-business activism typically increases CEO compensation, whereas pro-manager activism decreases it. Firms that benefit most from collective managerial activism are those that are government dependent, have more intangible assets, or operate in industries with low competition. Overall, pro-business managerial activism adds value to firms, especially when information dissemination is more essential due to firm characteristics.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":"86 ","pages":"Article 102588"},"PeriodicalIF":7.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Managerial activism\",\"authors\":\"Şenay Ağca , Aslı Togan-Eğrican\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102588\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We examine managerial activism through collective action in the corporate sector. Activist managers spend considerable resources in pursuing pro-business and pro-manager issues. While managerial activism is valuable in the pursuit of pro-business strategies, pro-manager agendas may exacerbate agency problems. Our evidence shows that firm performance improves with managerial activism through collective pro-business effort but is diminished by pro-manager activism. Furthermore, pro-business activism typically increases CEO compensation, whereas pro-manager activism decreases it. Firms that benefit most from collective managerial activism are those that are government dependent, have more intangible assets, or operate in industries with low competition. Overall, pro-business managerial activism adds value to firms, especially when information dissemination is more essential due to firm characteristics.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15525,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"volume\":\"86 \",\"pages\":\"Article 102588\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924000506\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Corporate Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119924000506","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine managerial activism through collective action in the corporate sector. Activist managers spend considerable resources in pursuing pro-business and pro-manager issues. While managerial activism is valuable in the pursuit of pro-business strategies, pro-manager agendas may exacerbate agency problems. Our evidence shows that firm performance improves with managerial activism through collective pro-business effort but is diminished by pro-manager activism. Furthermore, pro-business activism typically increases CEO compensation, whereas pro-manager activism decreases it. Firms that benefit most from collective managerial activism are those that are government dependent, have more intangible assets, or operate in industries with low competition. Overall, pro-business managerial activism adds value to firms, especially when information dissemination is more essential due to firm characteristics.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.
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