无主体体验的不可能性

IF 1.6 4区 心理学 0 PHILOSOPHY Journal of Consciousness Studies Pub Date : 2024-06-01 DOI:10.53765/20512201.31.5.026
G. Strawson
{"title":"无主体体验的不可能性","authors":"G. Strawson","doi":"10.53765/20512201.31.5.026","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"All experience is experiencing, and therefore entails an experiencer — i.e.a subject of experience. This is an a priori truth. It does not entail that, in the case of any given episode of experience, the portion of reality that is correctly said to be the experiencer (the subject\n of the experience) is something ontically distinct from the portion of reality that is the episode of experience itself, and there is one metaphysically fundamental way of conceiving of the subject of experience — the thin conception — given which the subject of an experience is\n not ontically distinct from the experience.","PeriodicalId":47796,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Impossibility of Subjectless Experience\",\"authors\":\"G. Strawson\",\"doi\":\"10.53765/20512201.31.5.026\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"All experience is experiencing, and therefore entails an experiencer — i.e.a subject of experience. This is an a priori truth. It does not entail that, in the case of any given episode of experience, the portion of reality that is correctly said to be the experiencer (the subject\\n of the experience) is something ontically distinct from the portion of reality that is the episode of experience itself, and there is one metaphysically fundamental way of conceiving of the subject of experience — the thin conception — given which the subject of an experience is\\n not ontically distinct from the experience.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47796,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Consciousness Studies\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Consciousness Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.026\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Consciousness Studies","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.5.026","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

所有的经验都是体验,因此必然有一个体验者,即体验的主体。这是一个先验真理。但这并不意味着,在任何特定的经验事件中,被正确地说成是经验者(经验的主体)的那部分现实与作为经验事件本身的那部分现实在本体论上是不同的,有一种形而上学的基本方式--薄概念--来设想经验的主体,在这种方式下,经验的主体在本体论上与经验并不不同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The Impossibility of Subjectless Experience
All experience is experiencing, and therefore entails an experiencer — i.e.a subject of experience. This is an a priori truth. It does not entail that, in the case of any given episode of experience, the portion of reality that is correctly said to be the experiencer (the subject of the experience) is something ontically distinct from the portion of reality that is the episode of experience itself, and there is one metaphysically fundamental way of conceiving of the subject of experience — the thin conception — given which the subject of an experience is not ontically distinct from the experience.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
14.30%
发文量
58
期刊最新文献
Depersonalization, Meditation, and the Experience of (No-)Self Being You — Or Not: A Challenge for Garfield and Seth Selves Beyond the Skin: Watsuji, 'Betweenness', and Self-Loss in Solitary Confinement and Dementia Selfless Minds, Unlimited Bodies?: Homeostatic Bodily Self-Regulation in Meditative Experiences Is it Possible to Imagine Being No One?
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1