是说什么还是怎么说?

IF 1.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-23 DOI:10.1007/s10683-024-09830-4
Xiangdong Qin, Siyu Wang, Mike Zhiren Wu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了自由形式交流在促进连续社会困境博弈中合作的有效性的驱动机制。我们假设,自由形式交流的自我构建特性会提高信息的真诚度,并增加不兑现承诺的不可取性。我们的实验结果表明,自由形式的信息优于受限制的承诺,也优于受试者选择和使用先前构建的自由形式信息的处理。有趣的是,我们发现被选中的自由形式信息和限制性承诺能达到相似的合作水平。我们观察到,具有较高诚意的自由形式信息会增加高价和高质量选择的可能性,从而促进合作。这些信息通常包括承诺和诚实,而威胁则不会促进合作。我们的研究结果强调了自由形式信息的自我构建性在促进合作中的关键作用,与限制性交流协议相比,自由形式信息的影响超过了信息内容的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Is it what you say or how you say it?

This study investigates the mechanisms driving the effectiveness of free-form communication in promoting cooperation within a sequential social dilemma game. We hypothesize that the self-constructing nature of free-form communication enhances the sincerity of messages and increases the disutility of dishonoring promises. Our experimental results demonstrate that free-form messages outperform both restricted promises and treatments where subjects select and use previously constructed free-form messages. Interestingly, we find that selected free-form messages and restricted promises achieve similar levels of cooperation. We observe that free-form messages with higher sincerity increase the likelihood of high-price and high-quality choices, thereby promoting cooperation. These messages frequently include promises and honesty, while threats do not promote cooperation. Our findings emphasize the crucial role of the self-constructed nature of free-form messages in promoting cooperation, exceeding the impact of message content compared to restricted communication protocols.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
8.70%
发文量
40
期刊介绍: Experimental methods are uniquely suited to the study of many phenomena that have been difficult to observe directly in naturally occurring economic contexts. For example, the ability to induce preferences and control information structures makes it possible to isolate the effects of alternate economic structures, policies, and market institutions.Experimental Economics is an international journal that serves the growing group of economists around the world who use experimental methods. The journal invites high-quality papers in any area of experimental research in economics and related fields (i.e. accounting, finance, political science, and the psychology of decision making). State-of-the-art theoretical work and econometric work that is motivated by experimental data is also encouraged. The journal will also consider articles with a primary focus on methodology or replication of controversial findings. We welcome experiments conducted in either the laboratory or in the field. The relevant data can be decisions or non-choice data such as physiological measurements. However, we only consider studies that do not employ deception of participants and in which participants are incentivized.  Experimental Economics is structured to promote experimental economics by bringing together innovative research that meets professional standards of experimental method, but without editorial bias towards specific orientations. All papers will be reviewed through the standard, anonymous-referee procedure and all accepted manuscripts will be subject to the approval of two editors. Authors must submit the instructions that participants in their study received at the time of submission of their manuscript. Authors are expected to submit separate data appendices which will be attached to the journal''s web page upon publication. Officially cited as: Exp Econ
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